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"Double Taxation" of Dividends, Differential
Taxation of Stockholders, and Income Tax Relief
Taxation of Corporate Earnings
To discuss the personal income tax on dividends and neglect the fact
that the corporate earnings out of which dividends are paid have been
taxed at the corporate level, as in the first part of Chapter 3, does not
get at the heart of stockholder taxation. To proceed, as in the latter
part of Chapter 3, to take account of corporate earnings and the cor-
poration income tax without relating them to the individual's "ca-
pacity to pay" and combined income tax burden fails to remedy this
deficiency.
This chapter is addressed directly to the problem of the differential
income tax burden on stockholders. First, the "double taxation" of
dividends is examined, and then the broader question of the taxation
of corporate earnings whether distributed or retained is taken up.
Finally there is a discussion of the income tax relief for stockholders
introduced in 1954 which Congress was asked by President Kennedy
(April 1961) to repeal. All that follows, unless otherwise specified, is
based on the tax incidence assumption implicit in the charge of
"double taxation" of dividends (or corporate earnings), viz., that the
incidence of the corporate income tax is on stockholders via a direct
and commensurate reduction in the corporate earnings available to
them. Thus we steer clear of two unsettled issues: (1) who in fact bears
the corporate tax, and (2) to what degree the tax has been capitalized,
i.e., to what degree present holders have purchased their stock at a
price lower, by the discounted value of all expected future tax pay-
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ments, than that which would have prevailed. With the tax so capi-
talized, those who are burdened by it would be those who held stock
at the time the tax was imposed; those who hold stock presently would
in many cases have purchased their shares "free of tax."
As to incidence, I claim no special knowledge, accept it as a matter
requiring further investigation, and adopt the nonshifting assumption
first because itis the assumption implicit in the much-used phrase
"double taxation," and secondly because it has not, in my judgment,
been disproved. If the corporate tax is shifted it resembles a sales tax
and/or tax on productive services and the analysis that follows is in-
appropriate.
Concerning capitalization of the tax, I am unable to go any further
than other tax burden studies have gone with this problem, but sug-
gest that this may not be assevere a handicap as has sometimes been
assumed.
To the question whether, in fact, the corporate income tax is capi-
talized and to what degree, it is impossible to find a quantitative an-
swer or even some general consensus on broad ranges of magnitudes.
Thus, while Dan T. Smith has pointed out that an "increase in the
corporation income tax, assuming a constant price-earnings ratio for
the stock, will depress the price of the stock commensurately,"one
cannot (and he does not) stop there. Crucial to the argument in this
precise form is the assumption Of a constant price-earnings ratio, i.e.,
a constant capitalization rate. But it is unlikely that this will actually
be the case. For the corporate tax cuts such a wide swath that its reper-
cussions will affect the rate by which the capital value of assets is reck-
oned; in other words, it is of the nature of a general tax whereas the
capitalization argument strictly applies to a partial tax—a tax that
affects one industry or type of asset.
Smith 2hasnoted a number of qualifications to the simple capitali-
zation argument:
The exact relationship between changes in corporate income tax
rates and stock prices is vastly involved. Though prospective earn-
ings per share are probably the most important single factor influ-
encing the market value of most securities, they are certainly not
the only, or even at all times the dominant, one. Present dividends,
1DanThroop Smith, Effectsof Taxation:Corporate Financial Policy, Boston,
1952, p. 87.
2Ibid.,pp. 86—87.
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book value, estimated liquidating value, and prospective changes in
all of these are among the other interrelated factors which make
impossible any assurance about the precise effects of changes in tax
rates on market values.
Also, any general readjustment of stock prices arising from a
change in corporate income tax rates would lead to significant but
quantitatively indeterminate changes in the yields of other forms
of investments, with inevitable readjustment in investors' portfolios
and a new pattern of yield differentials. Even more fundamentally,
a full analysis of the effects of corporate taxation is complicated by
such important but very elusive problems as the effects of the gov-
ernment expenditures financed by the tax on the general level and
direction of economic activity and the comparative effects of alter-
native revenue sources. These more involved analytical problems
can only be noted here as important qualifications to any simple
conclusions on the extent of influence of corporate income taxation
on stock prices.
His comments on capitalization point up how complicated the prob-
lem is. However, they permit these conclusions: First, for any degree
of capitalization to occur the initial incidence of the corporation in-
come tax must be on stockholders; secondly, whether the corporation
income tax is capitalized and, if so, to what extent remains a problem
fraught with uncertainty.
Moreover, is capitalization all important? Even if it had occurred,
it would have been uneven for various persons and would have been,
in general, a transitional phenomenon. If one is concerned with equal-
ity of tax treatment for different sources of income and not neces-
sarily with specific persons, then capitalization appears in a somewhat
different light. For, to the extent that it has occurred, alleviation of
the extra burden on distributed earnings would call for an accom-
panying capital gains tax to recapture the windfall gains of those who
had purchased their stocks free of tax.
On this point Professor Carl S. Shoup says:
Have present owners of common stock, by and large, purchased
their holdings, either from former holders, or from issuing corpora-
tions, with no expectation whatsoever of diminution in extra taxa-
tion? This is surely one of the most difficult factual questions ever
8"TheDividend Exclusion and Credit in the Revenue Code of 1954," National
Tax Journal, March 1955, p.144.
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posed in contemporary public finance. But ifthe answer were
strongly in the affirmative, the case for reducing extra taxation on
already outstanding issues of common stocks would be weak, from
the viewpoint of tax equity. Those whom the extra taxation had
truly harmed—the former holders of common stocks and those who
were deterred from buying new issues—can no longer be identified
and recompensed for the tax injustice.
This point does not, of course, weigh against reducing the extra
taxation with respect to new stock issues if there are any practicable
means of making such a distinction. And I am inclined to think that
the era of high tax rates and high extra taxation has not yet lasted
so long that more bonus would be given than injustice remedied by
granting the privilege to outstanding issues. Here we are on highly
subjective grounds. In any case, the problem would be mitigated
if approximately full taxation of capital gains could be achieved
before a truly substantial (dividend tax) credit was put into effect.
Now, back to the problem at hand. Taking into account both the
distributed and retained components of the corporate earnings of a
given year, and relating them proportionately to stockholder claimants
thereof, we may say that at no time since 1913 has our income tax
structure (corporate and personal combined) led to complete equiva-
lence of tax liability for corporate earnings and other categories of
income. But, for the distributed component alone which is our prime
concern in this section, equivalence was initially sought.
The personal income tax act of 1913 exempted dividends from nor-
mal tax. Both the tax rate on corporate income and the normal tax
rate on personal income were set at 1 per cent; thus for distributed
earnings the corporate tax operated as a withholding feature of the
personal levy. In effect there was a legislative admission (or assump-
tion) that the corporation income tax was a tax on the stockholder.
This treatment continued through 1918, as increases in the personal
normal rate were matched by increases in the corporate rate.4 But after
1919 the corporate rate exceeded the personal normal rate and thus
the corporate tax became, in part, a separate and distinct levy on dis-
tributed corporate earnings. The rate gap widened gradually until
1936, when the bridge between the two taxes was removed completely
4 With these exceptions: a corporate rate greater than the personal normal rate
in 1917, and greater than the rate applicable to the first $4,000 of normal tax in-
come in 1918.
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by the abolition of the dividend exemption. A return to legislation
that gave some recognition to the idea of "double taxation" appears
in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 in the form of a tax credit based
on dividends received. But here, too, a substantial gap exists between
the personal income tax credit and the rate of corporate tax. There-
fore, since 1919 the distributed earnings of corporate enterprises have
been treated differently from the other sources of income for federal
income tax purposes: from 1919 through 1935, because the corporate
rate was higher than the personal normal rate; from 1936 through
1953, because corporate earnings were taxed at the corporate level
when earned with no allowance at the personal level when distributed;
and from 1954 on, because the personal income tax relief accorded
distributed earnings falls short of the corporate tax rate.
Of course, especially in the earlier years of the income tax, because
both personal and corporate rates were "low," the failure to achieve a
tax treatment for distributed earnings equivalent to that for other
income shares might have had "slight" consequences. And, naturally,
much more severe disparities could be expected with the rapid rise
of tax rates in the last twenty years. The magnitudes associated with
this lack of uniformity in tax treatment will be explored shortly. First,
however, it is necessary to explain some conceptual procedures. This
can most conveniently be done by referring to the situation that ex-
isted from 1936 through 1953. Then qualifications relevant to the




We are interested in developing a measure of the degree to which
distributedcorporate earnings have been differentially taxed. For sim-
plicity, we start with the relation that characterized the period 1936
through 1953. Over these years dividends upon receipt by the stock-
holder were subject in full to personal income tax rates, while the
5Themain outlines of this conceptual framework are not novel. In setting it up,
I have drawn on the work of previous investigators, in particular: Richard B.
Goode, The Corporation Income Tax, New York, 1951; The Postwar Corporation
Tax Structure, Washington. 1946; and W. L. Crum, "The Taxation of Stockholders,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 1950.
The considerations set out here are discussed at greater length in Holland, In-
come-Tax Burden, Chapter 1.
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earnings out of which dividends were paid had already been taxed at
the corporate level. This differs from other corporate payments such
as wages or interest which were free of corporate tax. Hence the charge
of "double taxation of dividends." But literally interpreted this charge
is wrong, since it is not dividends but the earnings permitting their
payment which were taxed twice. And the charge is not very informa-
tive since it seems to suggest an equally onerous extra burden on all
stockholders regardless of their level of income.
For our problem, dividends are not the relevant component of stock-
holders' income. Rather, in estimating the reduction caused, in poten-
tially disposable income, by this tax, we must work with the pre-tax
equivalent of distributed earnings, to which we give the title of earn-
ings for distribution. Assuming for simplicity a corporate tax rate of
50 per cent, then for every dollar of dividends paid out, corporations
must earn two dollars. If a given stockholder, therefore, has $100 of
dividends, the earnings-for-distribution component of his income will
be $200. The difference between earnings for distribution and divi-
dends measures the corporate tax on the distributed segment of net
corporate earnings. To this is added the personal income tax on divi-
dends (considered an increment to the stockholder's taxable income
from other sources) in order to obtain the total income tax actually
levied on earnings for distribution.
But this does not measure the differential tax load. For the personal
income taxpayer is not deprived of an amount of potential income
equal to the corporate tax payment on earnings for distribution. Had
this sum been paid to him instead of to the government, it would have
been taxable as personal income. So it is only the difference between
the corporate tax and the product of the corporate tax multiplied by
the marginal rate of personal income tax that represents the extra
burden on stockholders' earnings for distribution. For example, with
the corporate rate at 50 per cent, every dollar of earnings for distribu-
tion bears a 50-cent corporate tax, but had this 50 cents been paid
to stockholders it would have represented something less than a 50-cent
addition to their personal income after tax. If the relevant marginal
rate is 20 per cent, the deprivation due to the corporate tax will be
40 cents; if the potential marginal rate is 90 per cent, the corporate
tax causes a loss of potential disposable income of only 5 cents. Thus
in our measure of the extra burden on dividend recipients the poten-
tial personal income tax on earnings for distribution is computed and
subtracted from the actual combined corporate-personal income taxDividends Under the Income Tax
on that component of stockholder income to find the net extra burden
on the distributed portion of net corporate earnings. For comparisons
among income levels and between years, which will be undertaken
later in this chapter, the absolute extra burden was converted to an
incremental effective rate by taking it as a percentage of the earnings
for the distribution component of stockholders' income. We call this
measure the differential against earnings for distribution.
The derivation of the measure may be summarized symbolically as
follows (for simplicity, all tax rates and differentials are expressed as
ratios):
C0=effectiverate of corporate tax on earnings for distribution
D=dividendsreceived
E=earningsfor distribution; E—GeE=D
P =applicablemarginal rate of personal income tax 6
Ne=absoluteextra burden on earnings for distribution







SinceP rises as stockholder income rises but never reaches 100 per
cent, the differential against earnings for distribution is a declining
function of stockholders' income, but is always positive. In relation to
the distributed segment of net corporate earnings, then, the corporate
tax constitutes a burden that is always smaller than its face amount
and that varies inversely with the level of stockholders' income.
6Therelevant P here varies with stockholder taxable income level. Better nota-
tion, therefore, would be Pj with i running from zero to the top tax rate. How-
ever, for reasons that will become clearer when we consider other years as well as
the extra burden (or benefit) on earnings for retention, precision would require
quite complicated notation.
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1913—1935
The remarks above apply strictly to the years 1936—1953. They need
some modifications for earlier years when dividends were exempt from
personal normal tax (and from 1954 on because of the exclusion and
credit). Specifically, prior to 1954 the extra burden on earnings for
distribution was not always positive. In other words, stockholders
sometimes paid a smaller tax on their share of earnings for distribu-
tion then would have been due had these earnings been singly taxed
in full as part of their personal income.
To apply the formula developed above to this earlier period, we
need explicitly to take account of personal normal and surtax rates.
Therefore, let:
=normalrate of personal income tax
P8 =applicablesurtax rate of personal income tax;
rewrite the formula above as
Ne=PnD+P8D+CcE(PnE+P8E).
Now consider the situation as it existed in the first few years of the
income tax—i.e., when the corporate rate and the personal normal rate
were the same, and start with a "low" income stockholder not subject
to the surtax. The equivalence of the two rates means that equals
the nonapplicability of the surtax eliminates the P8 terms, and
the exemption of dividends from normal tax gets rid of leaving
no "extra" burden; Ne is equal to zero. But a different result applies
for the stockholder whose income was high enough to get him into
a surtax Then, and would wash out of the formula
as before (with corporate and personal normal rates equal) and
would drop out as explained, leaving=P8D—P8E.But clearly E
is always greater than D. Note that the difference between D and E
is precisely the corporate tax. It is the failure to include the corporate
tax payment in taxable personal income that leads to this tax benefit.
Under these conditions, therefore, the burden would always
be negative. Compare, for example, for 1916 the zero differential at
the $1,000 income level (not subject to surtax) with the tax benefit
(negative differential) of 0.2 per cent at the $500,000 income level in
Table 41.
7Upthrough 1916, the surtax was applicable to net incomes of $20,000 and over.
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We have failed so far to take account of those years—a large majority
of the years between 1913 and 1936—in which the corporate tax rate
and the personal normal rate were different. For formal completeness
we might examine both P,,> C and< C, but since during this
period when they were not equal the corporate rate always exceeded
the personal normal rate, the latter is the only case that will be con-
sidered. As before, we start with the no surtax situation first. Then,
in the formulae above, everything falls out except C6E — With
C6 greater thanN0 will always be positive, i.e., stockholders would
always be "overtaxed" on their earnings for distribution. This con-
clusion, however, would not necessarily apply to those dividend re-
cipients who were subject to surtax as well as normal tax. For we now
must add to the value of N0 a term P3D —P8Ewhich, since E exceeds
D, is always negative. With this as an offset to C0E —PEE,which is
always positive, then in the case where personal surtax applies with
corporate tax higher than personal normal tax, there may be "over-
taxation," "undertaxation," or equal taxation, depending on the rela-
tive size of the positive and negative terms.
We can, of course, say this much more: Since P8E equals P8D +
P8(CCE), then P8D drops Out and, after division by E, the negative term
becomes P8(C8). Also, dividing by E, C6E — becomes merely C0 —
P,.Therefore: As between years, the greater the excess of C0 over
the more likely overtaxation at any given income level, while in any
particular year, the higher the applicable P8, the greater P8(C6), and
the more probable undertaxation (i.e., a negative N6). Since P8 is a
function of stockholders' income, we can rephrase this conclusion to
the effect that the higher the stockholders' income, the more likely is
a negative differential against his earnings for distribution.
Again, to illustrate with data from Table 41: Note the 1.5 per cent
negative differential at $100,000 in 1922, and the 8.5 percentage points
of "overtaxation" at $1,000 of taxable income.
SINCE 1954
The tax burden on dividend recipients was lowered in two ways in
1954. President Eisenhower originally proposed relief of this order
of magnitude: "Specifically, I recommend that the credit be allowed
on an increasing scale over the next three years. For this year, I rec-
ommend that a credit of 5 per cent be allowed; for 1955, a credit of
10 per cent; and, in 1956 and later years, 15 per cent. To avoid shifts
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in the payment dates of corporation dividends, these credits should
apply to dividends received after July 31, of each year. To give the
full benefit immediately to small stockholders, I recommend that the
first $50 of dividends be completely exempted from tax in 1954 and
that the first $100 be exempted in 1955 and later years." 8
Thisproposal proved to be one of the thorniest and most contro-
versial considered in writing the revenue bill. After hearings and de-
bate, Congress followed the outlines of the President's suggestion but
set the amounts at a lower level. Marion B. Folsom, then Under Sec-
retary of the Treasury, noted, "Under the new Code each stockholder
will be permitted to exclude from his gross income up to $50 of divi-
dends and will be allowed a credit against tax equal to 4 per cent of
the dividends in excess of the exclusion. The amount of the credit is
limited to 2 per cent of the stockholders' total taxable income in 1954
and to 4 per cent in later years."
The formula at the start of this section that summarized the "extra"
burden, viz., NØ/E =C6(l—P),now must be adjusted because of the
relief provisions. First, we take up the credit. Recall that D =E—CE.
Thereforethe credit which is equal to 0.04D, also equals as a rate (i.e.,
after division by E) 0.04 —0.04(C6),and with C6 equal to 52 per cent,1°
this comes to 0.0 192. So at all income levels, the "extra" burden is
lowered by 1.92 percentage points.1' (It is worth noting that had Presi-
dent Eisenhower's original proposal been adopted, currently the credit
would amount to 15 per cent of dividends or 7.2 cents per dollar of
earnings for distribution; this would provide a net tax benefit at
higher income levels.) Because of the credit, we adjust downward our
8TheBudget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June
30, 1955, Washington, 1954, p. M 18.
9Remarksby Marion B. Folsom, Under Secretary of the Treasury, before the
American Management Association, New York City, August 19, 1954. The $50 ex-
clusion applies to separate returns. Stockholders filing jointly are permitted an
exclusion of $100, if each has at least $50 of dividends. See Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, Public Law 591, Chapter 736, Sections 34 and 116.
10Theuse of a 52 per cent rate, of course, is a gross simplification. Only in the
limit is this 52 per cent approached, although for large corporations it is approached
closely enough to be a realistic figure. Many corporations pay only 30 per cent. The
average rate on all corporations was less than 43 per cent in 1956. But some cor-
porations, those filing consolidated returns, may pay dose to 54 per cent. Moreover,
there are numerous special provisions and tax rates. In sum, the average rate
(effective rate) on corporations in the aggregate is well below 52 per cent; the
marginal rate in the aggregate is probably quite close to 52 per cent.
11Thisis the same as saying that since, with a corporate tax of 52 per cent,
D —0.48of E, the credit of 0.04D equals 0.0192 or 1.92 percentage points.
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measure of the differential (the "extra" burden as a rate) against earn-
ings for distribution; i.e., it now reads
N8—= C8(1—F)—0.04(1—C8).
The credit, of course, will lower the differential by a flat amount
(as noted above, under existing law, assuming the full corporate rate
of 52 per cent to apply, the differential will be cut by 1.92 percent.
age points). But the differential itself varies inversely with P, i.e.,
with the stockholder's taxable income. Thus near the bottom of
the income scale the credit would be responsible for a very slight rela-
tive reduction in the differential; near the top of the income scale,
however, we should expect to find the "extra" burden reduced by a
substantial percentage. This feature of the credit is somewhat obscured
in comparing the Statistics of Income data from tax returns for 1953
and 1955 (the first year in which the full credit was operative) because
tax rate changes between these two years, particularly the decline in
personal income tax rates, tended, ceteris paribus, to make for higher
differentials in 1955 than 1953.
The credit, as we have just observed, gives a flat amount of relief
at all stockholder income levels, and thus is not directly geared to
the condition for which it is designed to provide relief. But the ex-
clusion is even less focused on the problem. For, like any deduction,
it is the more valuable the higher the applicable marginal rates of
tax, while the differential declines in severity the higher the stock-
holder's marginal rate of tax.12 But limited to a specific amount of
dividends, the exclusion has a strong effect only on those who receive
a small amount of dividends. In our tabular comparisons for 1954—60,
those related to marginal dollars (Table 41) neglect the exclusion com-
pletely (assuming the marginal dollar to come in above the exclusion),
while those that are based on assuming all income to be corporate
earnings (Table 40) tend to swamp out the exclusion's effect since it
is limited to $100 of dividends at most.
For a more general statement, the exclusion and credit can be com-
bined as follows: with the corporate tax at 52 per cent, earnings for
12Forexample, not paying tax on $1 of dividends saves 20 cents in the 20 per
cent rate bracket and 90 cents in theper cent rate bracket. Yet at the former
level, the differential is 40 per cent (assuming, for simplicity, a corporate rate of
50 per cent) and only 5 per cent at the latter level.
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DIFFERENTIAL AS A PERCENTAGE OF EARNINGS FOR DISTRIBUTION, COMPUTED AT AVERAGE




1913—1915 0.00.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 e g h
1916 0.00.0 0.0 0.0 b d —1.8 —2.0
1917 2.0 1.3 0.8 0.3 —0.2 —0.4 —0.8 —1.8 —2.2
1918 6.06.0 4.8 2.0 —0.3 —2.2 —5.2 —7.5 —7.7
1919—1921 6.06.0 5.2 3.3 1.6 0.1 —2.4 —4.3 —4.5
1922 8.5 8.5 7.7 6.0 4.0 2.2 —0.9 —1.7 —1.7
1923 9.5 9.5 8.9 7.6 6.7 4.8 2.5 1.8 1.8
1924 11.011.0 10.7 9.0 7.0 5.0 2.6 1.9 1.5
1925 11.811.9 11.6 10.4 8.2 6.9 5.8 5.4 5.4
1926—192712.312.4 12.2 10.9 8.6 7.4 6.2 5.8 5.4
1928 10.810.9 10.6 9.4 7.2 6.0 5.0 4.6 4.6
1929 10.610.6 10.4 9.3 6.4 5.7 5.1 4.8 4.8
1930—193110.810.9 10.6 9.4 7.2 6.0 5.0 4.6 4.6
1932—1933 9.89.7 9.9 7.2 5.2 3.2 —0.2 —1.4 —1.6
1934—193510.210.1 9.2 8.9 7.4 6.1 4.1 2.0 1.8
1936—193714.414.5 13.8 13.5 11.9 10.4 7.4 4.2 3.6
1938—193918.318.3 17.4 17.2 15.2 13.3 8.1 5.2 4.6
1940 23.423.1 22.1 20.9 16.3 12.9 9.1 5.1 3.9
1941 28.328.5 26.8 26.4 20.0 13.3 10.4 7.6 6.9
1942—194332.532.6 31.1 27.6 18.9 15.6 8.3 4.8 4.8
1944—194530.830.1 29.0 26.0 17.0 11.6 5.8 2.4 3.9
1946—194730.630.1 29.3 26.0 18.0 15.0 8.0 5.1 5.3
SEPARATE RETURNS
1948—194931.630.8 29.9 27.1 19.4 15.2 10.3 6.8 8.7'
1950 34.633.8 32.8 29.9 21.4 16.1 10.6 6.6
1951 38.639.7 38.5 34.8 23.8 16.6 9.6 4.6 5.9
1952—195340.439.7 38.3 34.1 21.8 15.5 9.2 4.2 5.8'
1954 40.940.2 38.7 35.1 24.0 16.5 9.1 3.7 5.2 1
1955—196138.938.7 37.7 34.1 23.0 153 8.1 2.6 4.2
JOINT RETURNS
1948—194931.631.7 31.7 29.4 25.3 16.7 15.2 9.2 6.8
1950 34.634.7 34.7 32.4 28.2 21.4 16.1 6.7 6.4
1951 38.639.7 40.2 38.5 34.6 23.8 16.6 4.9 4.6
1952—195340.440.5 39.8 38.3 32.8 21.0 15.5 4.6 4.0
1954 39.740.3 40.1 38.7 32.8 24.0 16.5 4.2 3.7
1955—196138.139.1 39.0 37.7 31.8 23.0 133 3.2 2.8
aAssumesall taxable income from earnings for distribution.
b —0.08.
o—0.01. g—0.05.
d —0.04. h —0.06.
o—0.03. 'Effective rate limit in effect.
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Noms ON DERIVATION OX? TABLE 40
Corporate taxes are taken at the highest rate, excluding excess profits tax. Dividends
exempt from individuals' normal tax until 1936.
From 1924 through 1943 (excluding 1932, 1933) there was an earned income credit.
In 1924 credit was against tax, while in other years against income.
Dividends and interest arc treated the same way with respect to the credit.
From 1944 on, limitation on effective rate of tax comes into effect.
For 1954 $25 is deducted ($50 for joint) from taxable income and 2 per cent of divi-
dends credited against tax.
For 1955—1961 $50 (and $100) exclusion and 4 per cent tax credit used.
distribution would be slightly more than twice as great as dividends,
and the exclusion limits would then be $104 (i.e., the pre-tax equivalent
of $50) for separate and $208 (i.e., the pre-tax equivalent of $100) for
joint returns. For brevity, only joint returns (the majority) will be
considered. The maximum relief afforded by the exclusion varies from
$20 to $91, or from 20 to 91 per cent of the excluded amount. With
the corporate tax at 52 per cent and dividends equal to 48 per cent
of earnings for distribution as E), the relief provided by
the tax credit equals 0.04 (0.48E —$100)for all stockholders. Hence
the combined relief, i.e., the sum of the credit and exclusion, covers a
span from 0.02E + $16 for stockholders in the 20 per cent rate bracket
to 0.02E + $87 for those subject to a marginal rate of 91 per cent; or,
measured as a differential relative to E, from 0.02 + $16/E to 0.02 +
$87/E.
When E is small, say $250 (i.e., when dividends are $120), the frac-
tions $16/E and $87/E will be considerably larger than 0.02 and
noticeably different from each other. The exclusion feature will out-
weigh the credit. When E is large, say $100,000, the two fractions and
the differences between them become insignificant. The credit pre-
dominates; the relief is very close to 2 per cent of earnings for distribu-
tion. We cannot, therefore, simply conclude that the patterns of relief
described for the credit and exclusion separately will characterize
their combination. The degree of relief will vary with the amount of
what we have defined as earnings for distribution. This, of course,
has reference only to comparisons of average (effective) rates and dif-
ferentials based thereon (as in Table 40) but not to those comparisons
concerned with marginal (incremental) dollars of earnings for distribu-
tion (as in Table 41).
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DiFFERENTIAL AS A PERCENTAGE OF EARNINGS FOR DISTRIBUTION, COMPUTED FOR MARGiNAL




1913—1915 0.00.0 0.0 0.0 a o b d d
1916 0.00.0 0.0 0.0 ° b —0.1 —0.2 —0.2
1917 2.00.0 b —0.1 —0.3 —0.5 —1.1 —2.0 —2.4
1918 6.0 6.0 —0.1—0.5 —1.3 —2.9 —6.2 —7.7 —7.8
1919—1921 6.0 6.0 1.9 1.6 0.9 —0.4 —3.2 —4.4 —4.5
1922 8.5 8.5 4.5 4.3 3.3 1.6 —1.5 —1.8 —1.8
1923 9.59.5 6.5 6.3 5.6 4.3 2.0 1.8 1.8
1924 10.510.5 8.5 6.4 5.6 3.6 0.5 0.3 0.3
1925 11.511.5 10.0 7.9 7.1 6.3 5.4 5.4 5.4
1926—192712.012.0 10.5 8.4 7.6 6.7 5.8 5.8 5.8
1928 10.510.5 9.0 6.9 6.2 5.4 4.6 4.6 4.6
1929 10.510.5 9.0 6.9 6.2 5.8 4.8 4.8 4.8
1930—193110.510.5 9.0 6.9 6.2 5.4 4.6 4.6 4.6
1932—1933 9.8 9.8 5.8 5.5 4.4 2.6 —0.9 —1.5 —1.8
1934—1935 9.8 9.8 9.2 8.8 7.4 5.6 2.6 1.9 1.6
1936—193714.414.4 13.8 13.4 11.9 9.8 5.7 3.9 3.5
1938—193918.218.2 17.5 16.9 15.0 12.4 7.2 4.9 4.4
1940 22.922.9 21.9 20.3 15.8 11.3 7.6 4.5 3.7
1941 27.927.0 25.7 22.0 16.1 12.1 9.6 7.1 6.5
1942—194332.431.2 29.6 24.8 16.8 11.2 6.0 4.8 4.8
1944—194530.830.2 28.4 23.6 15.2 8.8 4.0 2.4 4.0
1946—194730.830.1 28.6 24.3 16.7 10.9 5.9 5.2 5.2
SEPARATE RETURNS
1948—194931.730.6 29.3 25.3 18.3 12.9 8.2 6.8 9.7
1950 34.733.6 32.1 27.5 21.5 13.3 8.0 6.6 8.4°
1951 40.439.4 37.1 31.0 20.3 12.7 5.6 4.6 6.5°
1952—195340.539.2 36.9 30.2 17.7 12.0 5.2 4.2 6.2°
1954 40.739.6 37.5 31.3 20.4 12.0 4.8 3.7 5.3°
1955—196139.738.6 36.6 30.3 19.4 11.1 3.8 2.8 2.8
JOINT RETURNS
1948—194931.731.7 30.6 29.3 23.6 18.3 12.9 6.8 6.8
1950 34.733.6 32.1 27.5 25.6 21.5 13.3 6.6 6.6
1951 40.440.4 39.4 37.1 28.9 20.3 12.7 4.6 4.6
1952—195340.540.5 39.2 36.9 27.0 17.7 12.0 4.2 4.2
1954 40.640.6 39.6 37.5 28.7 20.4 12.0 3.7 3.7





eEffectiverate limit in effect.
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Noms ON DERIVATION OF TABLE 41
Highest corporate rate is applied each year excluding excess profits tax.
All reductions or increases in personal rates are included in rates. (E.g., for 1923
the 25 per cent refund is taken into account in computing the rates.)
Dividends excluded from normal tax until 1936.
Earned income credits are ignored.
In years where there is a limit to the effective rate, figures apply to limit rather
than marginal rate. (E.g., in 1944—1945, 90 per cent limit applies to upper bracket.)
For 1954—1961 dividend exclusion provision is ignored since marginal rates on
dividends assumed in excess of exclusions are being applied. In 1954, a 2 per cent
credit is used, for 1955—1961 the credit is 4 per cent.
An Alternative Measure
There is, of course, nothing unique about the measure chosen. In my
judgment it is simple, direct, and meaningful. Moreover, it can be
easily and conveniently extended to the retained component of corpo-
rate earnings, as will be seen later in this chapter.
In particular, our measure of the differential relates the extra tax
to the base on which it is levied—corporate earnings. There is nothing
wrong with such a measure; indeed, it seems a natural thing to do.
But it could be argued that to stop at this point is to leave part of
the story untold. For another interesting and valid base is income
after tax. At the very least it would be an incomplete presentation of
the facts if we failed to consider the "extra" burden on stockholders
in relation to income after tax; and it could be downright misleading
to fail to do so.'3
This is a convenient place to examine the "extra" burden in rela-
tion to income after tax. As a start, we restate the particular measure
used so far and the effect of the dividend tax credit in more general
terms. Then some comparisons using income after tax are made. The
symbols are as defined earlier unless otherwise stated with these excep-
tions:
To avoid too much notation, what was C6 will be written more
simply as C. Also, NB will designate the extra burden before the credit;
NA will denote the extra burden after the relief provided by the credit.
1. "The" differential, i.e., our measure of the "extra" tax on earnings
for distribution is:
13Fora recent statement that stresses the necessity of analyzing tax liabilities
and changes therein in relation to income both before and after tax, see Dan Throop
Smith, Federal Tax Reform, New York, 1961, particularly page 37.







where aisthe fraction of dividends allowed as a tax credit.
The conclusion from this formulation is familiar by now. The
extra burden, C(l —P),declines as P increases; the relief, a(l —C),
is constant for all doubly taxed stockholders. The amount of relief
is the same for all stockholders, but the degree of relief varies directly
with their income level.
To take some illustrative figures: with C =50per cent, a= 4per
cent, and P's of 20 and 90 per cent (all personal income taxpayers in
effect fall in rate brackets bounded by these two), then the 20 per cent
rate stockholder's differential is reduced from 40 to 38 per cent; for
the 90 per cent rate stockholder, the reduction is from 5 to 3 per cent.
The proportionate relief, i.e., the relative degree of relief, can be ob-
tained by relating the credit to the extra burden.
a(1 —C)
—F)
where /3 can be considered to be the degree of relief.
With the numerator constant and the denominator declining with
increasing P, then the higher F, the larger /3.
2.Now consider NB/(E —FE),that is to say, consider the extra
burden in relation to earnings for distribution after tax, the tax in
this case being the personal income tax that would have applied to
earnings for distribution in the absence of the corporate tax.
NBCE(l_P)c
E—PEE(1—P) —
Thisappears to be quite a different result from our usual formula-
tion, for here we find the extra burden to be invariant with stockholder
income level; it is simply the corporate tax rate. Yet the conclusion
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previously reached that the credit provides proportionately greater
relief for higher income stockholders still holds. Because:








C is a constant for all doubly taxed stockholders, as is the term
a(l —C).As P gets larger, a(l —C)/(l—P)gets larger. Therefore
C —a(l—C)/(l—P)gets smaller. To insert some illustrative num-
bers, as before let:
C =0.5,a =0.04,P1 =0.2andF2 =0.9.
Then for the 20 per cent bracket stockholder we have:
NA a(1 —C) 0.04(1 —0.5)
=C— =0.5— =0.475.
E—PE 1—P1 1—0.2
While for the 90 per cent bracket stockholder we have:
NA a(1 —C) 0.04(1 —0.5)
=C— =0.5— =0.300.
E—PE 1—P2 1—0.9
The extra burden is reduced from 50 to 47.5 per cent in the one
case, and from 50 to 30 per cent in the other. That is to say, before
taking account of the dividend tax credit on $1,000 of earnings for
distribution, the 20 per cent tax bracket stockholder would have $400
left after corporate-personal tax, while he would have $800 left under
the personal tax alone. Similarly, again on $1,000, the 90 per cent
bracket stockholder would have $50 and $100, respectively. In both
cases, the reduction in after-tax income would be one half,i.e.,
$400/$800 =$50/$100=1/2. Afterrelief, however, the reduction would
be $380/$800 and $30/$l00. Both have been given $20 of relief, but
clearly, the high rate stockholder has been given a proportionately
higher degree of relief, relative to the after-tax income he would have
in the absence of the corporate income tax.
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It should be observed that this measure of "overtaxation" implies
that a given percentage reduction in after-tax income has the same
significance regardless of the extent to which the before-tax income
has been reduced by the personal income tax. That is, although the
50 per cent reduction in the $800 after-tax income of the low income
stockholder is arithmetically the same as the 50 per cent reduction in
the $100 after-tax income of the high income stockholder, these equal
percentage reductions may not necessarily be regarded as equivalent
by the taxpayers concerned, or by legislators. Although the additional
$1,000 of before-tax earnings for distribution have been brought 50
per cent closer to zero dollars in both instances, that belonging to the
high income taxpayer was nearer that point to begin with. The reason
for this, of course, lies basically with the progressivity of the personal
income tax schedule, but this does not necessarily justify an assump-
tion that equal percentage reductions in income after the personal tax
are, from the point of view of tax equity, really equal.
To revert to the main theme of this section, it appears that the
deprivation due to the corporate tax amounts to the same fraction for
all stockholders. If the corporate rate were 20 per cent, for example,
then after the corporate and personal tax on their earnings for distri-
bution, all stockholders, regardless of income level, would have left
after taxes 20 per cent less than they would have had were there no
corporate tax and were their earnings for distribution (equal to divi-
dends in this case) taxed under the personal income tax. With the
corporate rate at 50 per cent, then the reduction in income after tax
due to "double taxation" amounts to 50 per cent of what they would
have had under the personal income tax alone.
But it would not be correct to argue from this proportionality that
because stockholders are deprived of a similar fraction of after-tax
income, an equal amount of relief per dollar of dividends, such as is
provided by the credit, is the appropriate remedy for their overtaxa-
don. For one thing, as already noted, equal amounts of relief mean
varying degrees of relief, a fact which the reader is free to qualify in
accordance with his attitudes toward the considerations pointed out
two paragraphs above. But, in addition, there is a simple arithmetic
fact that does not depend on attitudes for interpretation. At present
the credit leaves all stockholders overtaxed to some degree, but a
larger credit would change this. Whatever credit is chosen, however,14
14 Sometimes 10 per cent is suggested; Canada's 20 per cent has been cited as
appropriate; a 15 per cent credit wasinitiallyproposed in 1954.
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it will achieve equal taxation of earnings for distribution and other
income in only one particular marginal rate bracket. In rate brackets
higher than this, undertaxation will prevail, while overtaxation will
still be the case in rate brackets lower than the particular one.
That is to say, for equal tax treatment of earnings for distribution





whereis the credit that equalizes the tax liabilities for a stockholder in
a given tax bracket denoted by P. Therefore, a is a function of F, and
from the expression C(1 —F)= — C),it can be seen that, given
thenfor any P higher than F, C(1 —P) —C),while for any P
lower than P, C(1 —F)> —C).'5
If the extra burden due to the corporate tax is to be reduced pro-
portionately for each stockholder, the credit should be a constant





The effect on after-tax income of such a credit would be equivalent




= [C(1—r)](1 — F),
where the term in brackets is, in effect, a lower corporate rate. Thus
a simple way of providing the equivalent of a proportional cut in the
extra burden is to lower the corporate rate. This might be done for
15Adiscussion of this point with particular reference to the 15 per cent credit
originally proposed in 1954 appears later in this chapter.
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all corporate earnings, or, directed to earnings for distribution only
via a credit against corporate tax for dividends paid. An alternative
procedure but with equivalent results would be to assume some frac-
tion of dividends received, say w, represented the amount of tax with-
held at source. From this would be subtracted the personal tax due
on this withheld amount, and the difference would be the net credit
allowed.16 This procedure would provide proportionate relief since




Finally the two procedures can be precisely related since for any given




In summary, every statement about the credit and the type of relief
it provides based on our preferred formulation could be phrased in
terms of relationships based on income after tax. Indeed, it would
be surprising if it could not be since nothing new has been introduced;
terms have merely been rearranged. Yet a purpose is served by this
relatively lengthy aside. First, the similarity of the conclusions based
on after-tax measures and pre-tax measures is not immediately obvious.
Secondly, this similarity relates to conclusions concerning the dividend
credit and its appropriateness. In other connections, the two sets of
bases for measuring the extra burden may give different results. In
particular, we will remark on this once again when the trend in over-
taxation is discussed.
Variation of "Extra" Burden Among Income Levels and over Time
In addition to what we have noted about the special provisions in par-
ticular periods, it is worth reminding the reader that a "push-pull"
16Fora recent discussion of these two procedures and a demonstration of their
equivalence by numerical examples, see Growth and Taxes, Committee for Eco-
nomic Development, Washington, 1961, pp. A-i through A-G.
17SetC(l —r)(l—P)(1 —P)tC—w(l—C))and simplify to get this expres-
sion for w.
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relationship between the corporate and personal tax rates determines
the differential. Other things equal, a rise in the corporate rate will
send it up, a rise in the personal rate will send it down.
The relevant data, the "extra" burden as a percentage of earnings
for distribution, i.e., the differential, are summarized for stockholders
with selected amounts of taxable income in Tables 40 and 41. Table
40 presents the differentials calculated on the assumption that all of
the stockholder's taxable income was in the form of earnings for dis-
tribution, while in Table 41 the differentials are calculated on marginal
increments (strictly one dollar, but more generally the amount that
falls in the highest applicable bracket) of earnings for distribution at
the chosen taxable income levels. Both tables cover the period 1913—
1961, and in both, starting with 1948, there are two sets of entries—
one for joint returns, the other for separate returns. This distinction
was, of course, not necessary before 1948.
Basically, they tell the same story. The discussion will center on
the data of Table 41, and, wherever it is necessary to choose, joint
returns will be considered since they represent the more usual situa-
tiOn.18 This will obscure no matters of principle and make it easier to
focus on the broad sweep of the differentials. It also makes for sim-
plicity to take four typical taxable income levels—$1,000 to symbolize
low, $5,000 and $50,000 to stand for lower middle and upper middle
respectively, and $500,000 to represent the top of the income range.
One of the most important conclusions that emerges from Table 41
is the simple one that as a general rule over the whole of our income
tax history earnings for distribution have been "overtaxed," that is
to say the tax load on them was heavier than if the pre-corporate-tax
counterpart of dividends had been included in personal taxable in-
come and so taxed.19 But it is equally important to point out that the
degree of overtaxation was uneven, particularly among income classes.
This is what our earlier discussion would lead us to expect. In every
year, the greatest degree of "overtaxation" occurred at the lowest
income level, the least at the top of the income range.2° Thus, to cite
18In1956, for example, joint returns accounted for two-thirds of dividend re-
cipients and 65 per cent of total dividends on taxable returns. (See Statistics of In-
come, Individual Income Tax Returns—1956, pp. 23 and 27.)
19Withthe corporate tax paid thereon taken as a credit against personal income
tax liability so computed.
20Outsidethe purview of our tables fall those most heavily "overtaxed"—stock-
holders with income too low to be taxable. Their earnings for distribution paid the
corporate tax, while the personal tax that would have been due was zero.
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the evidence for only a sprinkling of years: In 1929, the differential
against earnings for distribution ranged from a high of 10.5 per cent
at the $1,000 stockholder taxable income level to a low of 4.8 per
cent at $1,000,000; or take 1939, where the span was from 18.2 to 4.4
per cent, again being higher the lower the stockholder's income; or
1949 where the range was 31.7 to 6.8 per cent; or the 1955—1960
gamut from 39.7 to 2.8 per cent; and going back to an early period,
in 1919 it was 6 per cent at the lowest income and —7.8 per cent at
the highest. Even in the earliest years of our period 1913—1917, when
the lower taxable income range suffered no "extra" burden at all,
i.e., the differential was zero, it is still true that the higher incomes
were taxed less heavily, for in these years (and some later ones as well)
their differential was negative; i.e., they enjoyed a tax benefit. (The
reasons for this have been developed above.)
Now let us look at variations over time for the four chosen income
levels (see Chart 7). But before undertaking a discussion of the trend
in the differential, it is important to pick up the thread of the note
on alternative measures that appeared several pages earlier. When
movements in overtaxation over time are analyzed on the basis of
Ce(l —P)as summarized in Table 41 and Chart 7,weare talking about
the "extra" tax as a decimal fraction (or percentage) of a given amount
of earnings for distribution. Everything that is said relates to this par-
ticular way of measuring overtaxation, which varies among income
classes markedly. The alternative measure, which relates the "extra
tax" to income after tax, shows for the period 1936—1953 a degree of
overtaxation invariant with stockholder income level (i.e., marginal
personal rate), and generally for the other years of our study, when
personal income tax relief was provided for dividend receipts,it
exhibits a less pronounced difference among income levels than does
Ce(1 —P).The relevant data, which appear in Table 42 and are
plotted on Chart 8, will be taken up after we examine the trend in
C0(1 —P).Reading from the beginning to the end of our period, at
the $1,000 level there is virtually continuous growth in the "extra"
burden. Thus we can summarize what happened very quickly by citing
the zero differential of 1913, the sizable 39.7 per cent differential in
1955—1960, and the additional information that from 1923 on it was
10 per cent or more. At $5,000 of stockholder's taxable income, much
the same pattern is found. At $50,000, too, a general tendency for the
weight of the extra "burden" to grow over time is apparent, yet there
are some noteworthy exceptions. Thus, until 1922, it was either zero
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CHART7
Differential on Marginal Increments of Earnings for Distribution
at Four Selected Taxable Income Levels, 1913—1961
(joint returns)
or negative, and from 1922 through 1935, it was at a moderate level,
generally 6 per cent or less. From that date to the present, the differ-
ential, of course, increased, but still remained well below those at the
lower income levels. At the $500,000 level, we find a result quite dif-
ferent from those noted heretofore. Definite undertaxation existed
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from 1913 through 1922, reaching almost an 8 per cent tax benefit
in 1918. This, by the way, was greater than any positive differential
experienced at this income level since that date. With negative differ-
entials in 1932 and 1933 also, this gives "undertaxation" for twelve
years, "overtaxation" of under 3 per cent for eleven years, "overtaxa-
tion" of between 3 and 6 per cent for twenty-one years, and a differ-
ential of over 6 per cent for only four years. Thus at this very high
income level, "overtaxatkn" was not a severe problem. Comparing
merely the terminal years of the period, we get a rise from —0.06
per cent to 2.8 per cent—certainly a moderate experience when judged
against that of most stockholders.
The explanation of this moderate "overtaxation" and its failure to
vary much 21overtime lies in the "push-pull" relation between cor-
porate and personal rates. Given the personal rate, the higher the
corporate rate, the higher the differential. Given the corporate rate,
the higher the personal rate, the lower the differential. The same re-
lation applies, of course, when both rates rise or fall together, as long
as they change differentially.22 Thus in 1938 stockholders at the top
of the income scale were more heavily "overtaxed" than in 1951,
despite a corporate rate of 50.75 per cent in this latter year compared
with 19 per cent in 1938, and a rise in personal marginal rates from
74 in 1938 to 91 in 1951. For while C6 rose by 31.75 points, 1 —Pfell
from 26 to 9, i.e., proportionately more than the increase in the cor-
porate rate. This is the explanation also that lies behind one of the
summary observations in the introduction where it was noted that
using the differential as the measure of overtaxation, for low and
moderate income stockholders the trend in overtaxation was sharply
upward, while for stockholders with very high incomes there was a
very modest rise. Indeed, for them overtaxation has been less severe
since 1952 than it was in l925_1981.23 More generally than is brought
21Comparedwith that of other income levels.
22Ormore precisely, to revert to our earlier symbols, as long as the change in Ce
and the change in 1 —Pare proportionately different. When C,, increases and P falls,
the differential will always increase; when C6 falls and P rises, the differential will
always decline.
23Toemphasize that itis overtaxation as measured by the differential against
earnings for distribution that is under discussion here, and to clarify further why
it is not incongruous to find a decline in overtaxation so measured coincident with
a rise in tax rates, the relevant data for two taxable income levels for the years
1926—192'? and 1955 to date are set forth.
[n 1926 and 1927 the corporate rate was 13.5 per cent; the normal tax from which
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• out in these numerical examples, what is involved in the change in
overtaxation when both the corporate rate and the personal rate rise
can be expressed as follows. (For convenience we use simpler notation
than heretofore.)
Letpi and= theamount of overtaxation per incremental dollar
of earnings for distribution where 1 and 2 denote two different years.
C1 and C2 =thecorporate rate in each of these years; C2> C.
P1 and P2 =therelevant marginal personal rate in each of these
years; P2 > P1.
To avoid undue complications, without really losing sight of princi-
ple, let us restrict the comparison to periods when neither the exemp-
tion of dividends from normal tax nor the dividend tax credit pre-
vailed, i.e., 19S6—195&
1. IfP2=i.e., both corporate and personal rates rise, but over-
taxation remains unchanged, then:
C2(1 —F2) C21—P1
P2= P1,or =1,hence —=
C1(1—F1) C11—P2
dividends were exempt was1.5per cent at the $1,000 taxable income level and 5
per cent for those with incomes of more than $8,000; no surtax applied if taxable
income was less than $10,000; the surtax on income over $100,000 was 20 per cent.
For the years 1955 to date, the corporate rate is taken to be 52 per cent; the marginal
rate applicable to $1,000 of taxable income is 20 per cent; while the marginal rate
for married persons with taxable incomes in excess of $400,000 income is 91 per
cent. Against personal income tax there is a credit equal to 4 per cent of dividends
received.
Let a —corporatetax on additional $1,000 of earnings for distribution; b =per-
sonal tax on $1,000 minus a; ca + btotal tax on additional $1,000 of earnings
for distribution; dpersonal tax on additional $1,000 of income from other sources;
and e —c—d—extraburden on an additional $1,000 of earnings for distribution =
overtaxation.
Note: $1,000 is chosen as a value that will give convenient numbers with no decimal
points. The additional amount could equally well be $1, $10, etc.
Stockholder with Stockholder with
$1,000ofTaxable Income $500,000 of Taxable Income
1926 and 19271955 to date 1926 and 19271955 to date
a $135 $520 $135 $520
b 0 77 173 418
c 135 597 308 938
d 15 200 250 910
a 120 397 58 28
As a reminder that there are other ways of measuring the degree of overtaxation,
from these same figures we compute the percentage reduction in after-tax income
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2. If overtaxation increased following a rise in both corporate and
personal rates, then:
C2(1 —F2) C2
P2 > P1,or >1,hence —>
C1(1 —F1) C11—P2
3. If overtaxation decreased following a rise in both corporate and
personal rates, then:
C2(1—P2) C2i—P1





Since C2/C1 is the same no matter what the stockholders income level,
while (1 —P1)/(l—P2)generally varies with income, itis perfectly
consistent to find overtaxation between two years increasing for some
taxpayers and declining for others. Now, by rearranging terms, at-
tention can be turned more directly to those cases where overtaxation
declines as rates rise. By rewriting (3), we note that this requires that:
occasioned by the corporate tax, i.e., the measure considered in the note several















1955 to date: —$910 =0.31.
Theresults here may seem to contradict the conclusions in the note that explained
this measure, because the $500,000 taxable income stockholder is less heavily over-
taxed than the $1,000 taxable income stockholder. But this is because both in 1926
and 1927 and 1955 to date special provisions related to the taxationdividends:
in the earlier years they were exempt from normal tax, and in the later period the
tax credit was in effect.
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1—Pi C2





If we let C1/C2 =k,the general expression for the P2 required for
overtaxation to increase, given P1 and the proportionate increase in
corporate rates (measured not directly but by k which is its inverse) is:
6. P2>k(Pi—1)+land
7. P2—P1>k(P1—l)+1—P1.
Thus, using fractions to represent percentages,
If= 0.10, 0.20, 0.90.
— 0.9 —0.9k,>0.8 —0.8k,••,>0.1—-0.1k,or
— > 0.9(1 —k),70.8(1—k)•••,70.1(1—k).
Thusit is clear that for any k < 1 (which is the case we are con-
sidering), the required rise in P, i.e., —P12,is absolutely (and also,
of course, relative to smaller, the larger For 0.9 (1 —
0.8(1—k)>•>0.1(1—k).
One further observation is in order here. Going back to inequality
(2), we note that as P2 approaches 1(i.e., confiscatory taxation of 100
per cent), (1 —P1)/(1—P2)grows larger without limit, and therefore,
if, as is the case, C1 > 0, then no conceivable increase in C2 (limited to
tax rates no greater than 100 per cent) could make (C2)/(C1) > (1 —
P1)/(1—P2).In this case the situation in (3) would apply automatically.
Is it not a strange result to find overtaxation inevitably declining as
personal rates approach 100 per cent? The answer, of course, is that
the result is strange only if one fails to distinguish between level of
taxation and overtaxation. If personal rates were 100 per cent, then
overtaxation would not exist, because payment of a tax on corporate
earnings would deprive stockholders of nothing, since had that money
come to them instead of going to the government, they would have
kept none of it.
This is not to argue that the way to cure overtaxatioñ, if indeed it
does exist (remember the incidence and capitalization assumptions
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behind our analysis), is to raise the personal rate to 100 per cent.
Rather, the purpose of this explanation is to remind the reader that
we measure overtaxation relative to a standard—that schedule of
rates which applies to personal income other than corporate earnings.
Earlier, in the section on alternative measures, it was pointed out
that the degree of overtaxation could be measured in different ways,
namely, in terms of the percentage reduction in income after the
personal tax that is attributable to the corporate tax on earnings for
distribution. This measure was invariant with stockholder income
level from 1936 through 1953. But from 1913 through 1935, because of
the exemption of dividends from personal normal tax, and from 1954
on, because of the credit (for simplicity the exclusion is neglected), the
upper income stockholders experienced a smaller percentage reduction
in after-tax income (or in a number of the earlier years a positive
increase) than the low marginal rate stockholders. The main interest
here is in the trend of overtaxation, and the relevant information
appears in Table 42 and Chart 8. At all income levels overtaxation
existed from 1925 on, and at the lowest income level from 1917 on.
Thus overtaxation set in earlier and in a slightly more pronounced
form at the lower income levels, and this difference persisted until 1936
when the complete divorce between the corporate and personal tax
that lasted through 1953 brought all income levels together; and over
this period overtaxation became increasingly severe. It bottomed Out
in 1954 with the introduction of the dividend tax credit, but only at
the high income levels has there been any really sizable reversal of
trend.
Effect of a More Liberal Dividend Credit
The relativity of answers according to what base is chosen that has just
been observed in discussing the variation in overtaxation over time is
not, as has been noted earlier, relevant to judgment on the effect of
the dividend tax credit. Therefore, without ambiguity, we can point
up a basic limitation of the credit by exploring more fully what would
have happened had the 15 per cent credit proposed by President
Eisenhower been in effect in, say, 1960. Table 43 lists the differential
tax rates on an added dollar of earnings for distribution:
1. As it would have been without any credit (column 2).
2. As it stood with the 4 per cent of dividends tax credit (column 3).
3. As it would have been with a 15 per cent credit (column 4).
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TABLE 42
PERCENTAGE REDUCTION IN EARNINGS FOR DISTRIBUTION AFTER PERSONAL TAX a
BECAUSEOF CORPORATE TAX, 1913—1961





1913—1915 0 0 _lb 0—
1916 0 0 _1b 0—
1917 2 0 _lb _4b
1918 6 0 _4b _32b
1919—1921 6 1 _lb _14b
1922 9 5 2 _4b
1923 10 7 5 0+
1924 11 9 6 _lb
1925 12 10 8 7
1926—1927 12ii 8 8
1928 11 9 7 6
1929 11 9 8 6
1930—1931 11 9 7 6
1932—1933 10 6 4 _4b
1934—1935 10 10 6 5
1936—1937 15 15 15 15
1938—1939 19 19 19 19
1940 24 24 24 24
1941 31 31 31 31
1942—1943 40 40 40 40
1944—1945 40 40 40 40
1946—1947 38 38 38 38
1948—1949 38 38 38 38
1950 42 42 42 42
1951 51 51 51 51
1952—1953 52 52 52 52
1954 51 51 50 41
1955—1961 50 50 48 31
Nom:In computing the degree of overtaxation for the table only corporate normal
and surtax rates were used, and the corporate rate was taken to be the maximum rate
of normal tax and surtax combined. But no account was taken of the excess profits
tax. Had there been some adjustment on this score (it is difficult to think of what it
could have been because of the uneven impact of the EPT), overtaxation would have
shown up as more severe than the table indicates.
This is the personal tax on the full amount of earnings for distribution, i.e., assum-
ing no corporate tax or, alternatively, the personal tax on an equivalent amount of
other income.
b Percentage increase indicated by a minus sign.
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CHART8
Percentage Reduction in Earnings for Distribution After Personal Tax
Because of Corporate Tax, 1913—1961
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TABLE 43
"EXTRA" BURDEN COMPUTED ON MARGINAL RATES AND RELIEF PROVIDED BY
DIVIDEND TAX CREDITS OF 4 AND 15 PER CENT, AT SELECTED LEVELS OF
STOCKHOLDERS' TAXABLE INCOME, 1961 a
"Extra"
"Extra"Burden After PercentagePercentage
Burden Dividend "Extra" ReductionReduction
in the Tax CreditBurden Afterin "Extra"in "Extra"
Taxable Absence of 4% DividendBurden DueBurden Due
Income of Any (Present Tax Credit to 4% to 15%
Level Relief Law) Credit Credit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
$ 1,000 $0.4160 80.3968 80.3440 4.6% 17.3%
3,000 .4160 .3968 .3440 4.6 17.3
5,000 .4056 .3864 .3336 4.7 17.8
10,000 .3848 .3656 .3128 5.0 18.7
25,000 .2964 .2772 .2244 6.5 24.3
50,000 .2132 .1940 .1412 9.0 33.8
100,000 .1300 .1108 .0580 14.8 55.4
500,000 .0468 .0276 — .0252 41.0
0
1,000,000 .0468 .0276 —.0252 41.0
0
NOTE: Col. 3 =col.2 —80.0192;col. 4 =Co1.2 —80.072.
aComputedon the basis of a corporate tax rate of 52 per cent and personal marginal
rates applicable to joint returns in 1957.
b As originally proposed by President Eisenhower, see the Budget of the United States
Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1955, Washington, 1954, p. 1718.
"Extra" burden converted to a tax saving.
Because P is always positive, in the absence of any credit a positive
(albeit declining) differential would exist at all income levels. The
relief presently afforded by the credit is not sufficient to change this,
involving at all income levels a cut of slightly under 2 points in the
differential. Had the 15 per cent tax credit been effective, however,
the relief would have been enough to cause a negative "extra" burden
on earnings for distribution at the top two of the taxable incomes
listed in our table.2' Any higher credit would mean a shift from
"burden" to "benefit" at a lower
24 More precisely, with a 52 per cent corporate rate assumed, the "break-even"
point would have been $180,000 of taxable income. This is for joint returns. For
separate returns, subject to higher marginal rates and, hence, lower differentials, the
"break-even" point would have come at $90,000 of taxable income. (For a neat and
precise formulation of the relationships involved here, see Carl S. Shoup, "The
Dividend Exclusion and Credit in the Revenue Code of 1954," National Tax Journal,
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The last three columns of Table 43 are designed to illustrate a
feature of the credit already noted. With a flat amount of credit per
dollar of earnings for distribution 26andan "extra" burden that falls
with rising stockholder income, the degree of relief, i.e., the percentage
by which the "extra" burden is cut by the credit, increases with stock-
holder income. Thus, the credit ameliorates less than 5 per cent of
the "extra" burden at the lower income levels (per marginal dollar of
earnings for distribution), but relieves those at the top of the income
range of over 40 per cent of their differentially heavier tax load. If the
15 per cent credit had been enacted, then, with tax rates assumed un-
changed, less than 20 per cent of the "extra" burden would have been
removed, for the lower stockholder incomes, while substantial relief
would have occurred higher up—well over half at $100,000, and relief
so great as to result in a tax saving for the very highest incomes.27
The relief actually obtained is,of course, determined by total
amount of dividends, not marginal dollars thereof. An estimate of
what it comes to for stockholders at different income levels appears in
the latter part of this chapter.28
Differential Taxation of Stockholders
The tax liability on distributed earnings by no means exhausts the
stockholder's tax burden. For while we have been able to identify an
inequality in the tax burden on stockholders' dividend receipts (or,
more precisely, on earnings for distribution), we have not yet evaluated
the extent to which the rest of the income generated by corporations
March 1955, p. 147.) In terms of our symbols we must find a P so that — F)
0.15(1 —C6).With C6 at 0.52, the relevant P is about 0.86, the closest bracket rate to
which is 0.87, applicable at the taxable incomes cited.
25Canada'sdividend tax credit, instituted in 1949 at 10 per cent, currently is 20
per cent.
26Assuminga corporate rate of 52 per cent, the credit is 0.04 ($0.48) or $.0192
per dollar of earnings for distribution.
27Rememberthat this applies to marginal increments to incomes of a given size,
and the particular figures just cited also refer to joint returns only. For separate
returns, which were not, of course, permitted to split their income, substantial
relief would occur considerably lower down the income scale as would the transition
from "over-" to "undertaxation."
28Therest of this chapter draws heavily on the author's book, The Income-Tax
Burden on Stockholders, from which some materials have been selected for summary
presentation here because they round out the discussion of the preceding section
of this chapter. For a more thorough discussion, additional data, and more details
on procedure than furnished here, the reader is referred to the book.
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for their stockholder owners is differentially taxed. The overtaxation
we found for distributed earnings could be exacerbated or moderated
by the tax treatment accorded retained earnings. And this would be
relevant to any discussion of dividend taxation since retention is the
alternative to distribution. We shall find that the most salient con-
clusion about stockholders' taxation is not that distributed earnings
bear an extra burden, but that when account is taken of their pro
rata share of corporate earnings, whether distributed or not, stock-
holders are unequally taxed compared with other income taxpayers.
And this inequality of taxation is not all in the direction of an extra
burden.2° On net balance, from this broader view, most stockholders
are overtaxed, but some are undertaxed. Who they are and what this
means will be spelled out as we go on.
The "Extra" Burden on Earnings for Retention
In our measure of the extent to which earnings for distribution (the
pre-corporate-tax counterpart of dividends) were overtaxed, the burden
of the corporate tax was moderated by taking account of the personal
income tax that would have applied. Thus we imputed a marginal
dollar of earnings for distribution (the pre-corporate-income-tax equiv-
alent of dividends), determined the potential personal income tax on
such an imputation, and compared with it the actual tax liability—
viz., the corporate income tax on earnings for distribution and the
personal income tax on dividends.
The degree to which the retained earnings component of stock-
holders' income is overtaxed is measured by a similar yardstick. In
connection with that part of corporate earnings not distributed to the
stockholder, in measuring what we again denote the extra burden, we
consider a basic amount of corporate income, to be designated earn-
ings for retention, which is the pre-corporate-tax equivalent of what
is usually called retained earnings. Under our present tax structure,
earnings for retention are subject to the corporate income tax. We,
on the other hand, estimate the potential personal income tax which
the earnings for retention would bear if they were fully distributed
29Thereader is reminded that these conclusions are valid only on the assumption
that the incidence of the corporation income tax is on profits. For only so far as
the tax falls on stockholders is there validity in the charge of "double taxation" of
dividends or in the finding of the overtaxation of distributed earnings.
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(or imputed) to the stockholders,8° and the difference between these
two tax liabilities is the extra burden if the actual exceeds the hypo-
thetical, the benefit if potential liability is bigger than the actual.
The extra burden, taken as a percentage of earnings for retention, we
call the differential against earnings for retention.
Acid to the symbols used earlier in this chapter:
R =earningsfor retention
C7 =effectiverate of corporate income tax on earnings for retention
(this is higher thanbecause earnings for retention are net of
deficits reported by loss corporations)
N7 =absoluteextra burden on earnings for retention







it is apparent that the differential against earnings for retention
can be positive, zero, or negative depending on the relative heights of
Cr and P. With Cr invariant on stockholders' income and P a rising
function thereof, the differential measured as a rate declines as stock-
holders' income rises, and if P is high enough at some point in the
income scale, the differential will become negative. (Note that because
the personal income tax rate schedule is progressive, the P that applies
here is higher than the one in the differential against earnings for
30Useofthis imputation procedure for retentions and distributions implies
neither support for nor opposition to a change in the tax laws that would treat
stockholders like partners. We adopted it as an analytical framework most relevant
for assessing the equity that attaches to the income taxation of stockholders (given
that the incidence of the tax is on profits).
81Wecould more properly write Pj. where jI and, likei, runs from zero to
the top marginal rate (see footnoteof this chapter). We felt this hypothecation of
subscripts might, on net balance, hinder rather than help our expression of the
basic relations involved here.
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distribution formula. More precisely, since earnings for retention are
taken to be incremental to earnings for distribution, they would be
subject to marginal rates equal to or greater than those applying to
earnings for distribution.)
As described, the actual tax load on earnings for retention Consists
simply of the corporation income tax, and the extra burden on this
segment of corporate earnings is measured as the difference between
the corporate tax and the hypothetical personal tax. This measure is
designated variant 1 of our standard method. Values of the differential
against earnings for retention (and of two additional measures de-
scribed below—the differentials against net corporate earnings and
stockholders' income—in the derivation of which this measure of the
extra tax burden on retained earnings is employed) we call variant 1
values. Variant 1 is a clear-cut measure that tells us for a given year
how much more (or less) income tax stockholders paid on their pro
rata share of earnings for retention than would have been due if this
income share had been subject promptly and in full to the personal
income tax alone. But it leaves out something.
For it can be argued that some portion, at least, of retained earnings
would show up as capital gains, and that some of these capital gains
would be realized by stockholders in taxable form. Thus, because of
current retentions, sometime in the future an additional tax liability
would be incurred. Therefore variant 2 was developed. Under variant
2, in measuring the tax load on retained earnings (before corporation
income tax), a term (explained below) was added to represent the
present value of the future capital gains tax on the undistributed
earnings of a given year. Unless otherwise specified it is the variant 2
values that are used throughout this section.
To make such an adjustment with precision is impossible, however.
Too many factors about which little is known are involved. To what
extent do retained earnings show up in share prices? What proportion
of resulting capital gains is realized, and of this what fraction shows
up in taxable form? Our adjustment, therefore,isarbitrary but
reasonable in the sense that it is in the right direction, and that sub-
stantial changes in the assumptions used in its derivation would lead
to only slight changes in the size of the estimated additional tax
liability on earnings for retention.
Briefly, variant 2 incorporates an additional tax liability of stock-
holders—a capital gains tax—determined on the assumptions that for
each dollar of retained earnings share prices rose by 72 cents, and that
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two-thirds of these increments in the value of stock were realized in
taxable form at an even rate over a five-year period.32 The adjustment
for the future capital gains tax ,liability enters as an additive term in
But it might be argued that this adjustment does not go far enough.
For one assumption used in the variant 2 estimate is that stock prices
rose by only 72 per cent of reinvested earnings; or that 28 cents of
every dollar of retained earnings failed to show up in enhanced stock
values. Apparently, then, when earnings are reinvested rather than
paid out, stockholders lose 28 cents per dollar of such earnings. Should
not this be considered a deprivation and, while not a formal tax,
should it not be taken into account in estimating the extra tax load
on earnings for retention? Despite good grounds for answering this
question in the negative (see the next paragraph), and because the
matter is debatable, variant 3 was developed. Very simply, in addition
to the corporate tax and the present value of the future capital gains
tax due to reinvested earnings, variant 3 includes the present value
of this 28 cents loss as though it were an additional tax on earnings
for retention. This adjustment affects Nr/R, making it higher than the
variant 2 values which, in turn, of course, exceed the variant I values
of the differentials.
But variant B seems to cover too much. For there is a difference be-
tween a tax and the reduction in potentially disposable income caused
by the failure of corporations to distribute fully. The latter lacks the
strong element of compulsion that characterizes a federal tax levy.
Stockholders are not forced to acquiesce in corporate distribution
policies. They can press for fuller distribution by the companies whose
shares they hold; or acquire shares in corporations whose policy it is
to distribute more of their earnings; or make other kinds of invest-
ments. On this reasoning variant 2 was selected as superior. Variant
3 goes too far; variant 1 not far enough.
32The72 cents comes from a finding for the period 1870—1937 "that every $2.50
of earnings retained by a corporation has, on the average, been associated with an
increase of $1.80 in the value of its stock" (Alfred Cowles 3rd and Associates,
Common Stock, Indexes 1871—1937, Principia, 1938, p. 42). The two-thirds and five
years are arbitrary, but varying the fraction and the number of years would not
change our measure much.
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Measuring the Differential Taxation of
Earnings for Stockholders
Combining the differentials against earnings for distribution and
earnings for retention furnishes a net result—the differential against
net corporate earnings, a weighted average of the differential against
each component.
Add to the symbols used up to this point:
T =netcorporate earnings =E+ R
=theabsolute extra burden on net corporate earnings










E+R/E\ IR =Ce(1P)( \E+R
NOTE:Thisis the formula based on variant 1 values of the differential
against earnings for retention. With variants 2 and 3 the procedures
are the same, but Nr/R and are larger. Also note that we use
the measure of the differential against earnings for distribution that
applied in the period 1936—1953. The dividend credit and exclusion
are not yet incorporated in our measure; they will be later.
The differential against net corporate earnings will, of course, have
the same characteristics as its components. The higher the proportion
of earnings for retention to total corporate earnings, the closer
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lies to Nr/R. Further, since both its components behave in the same
way on this score, it will be a declining function of stockholders' in-
come. Also, after a point Nr/R can (and in a number of years did)
weigh so heavily thatwill turn negative, i.e., an income tax differ-
ential in favor of net corporate earnings will exist at the higher income
levels.
By now it is evident that an income as well as a tax liability adjust-
ment is incorporated in these measures. That is to say, we conduct
our comparisons on the basis of the size of stockholders' income after
the imputation of their full pro rata share of net corporate earnings
(defined as the sum of earnings for distribution and earnings for re-
tention), or (the equivalent) the sum of dividends, corporate savings,
and corporation income taxes (with corporate savings taken net of
deficits). This distinguishes the results of this section from those pre-
sented earlier in this chapter. There for illustrative purposes we im-
puted small sums—marginal dollars. Now, however, in converting
adjusted gross income which contains stockholders' dividends as the
measure of their income from corporate activity to imputed gross
income which includes their full pro rata share of net corporate
earnings, we use a corporate earnings multiplier derived from the
ratio of pre-tax earnings to dividends for the corporate system as a
whole.83
Specifically this income adjustment was made each year as follows:
We used the data of Statistics of Income, primarily an array of
dividend recipients (stockholders) cross-classified by size of adjusted
gross income and dividend size class. The array consisted of over 200
cells—one, for example, containing the data on stockholders with
adjusted gross income of $4,000 to $5,000 and dividend receipts of
less than $100; another for those in the same income range, but with
dividend receipts falling in the range $100 to $200, etc. To the average
amount of dividends in each of these cells we applied the corporate
earnings multiplier and obtained imputed gross income by adding
this product to the average adjusted gross income in that cell. Then
stockholders were rearrayed into imputed gross income classes; averages
were struck and plotted, and from them we read off, for selected
imputed gross incomes, the amount of corporate earnings and taxable
income. With this information we proceeded in the manner already
described to measure the degree of differential taxation of earnings
33 Thus we measure the average experience and refer to our stockholders as
typical or representative stockholders at particular imputed gross income levels.
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for distribution, earnings for retention, and net corporate earnings.
The data cover only individuals who were "double-taxed." They leave
out fiduciaries (estates and trusts) and dividend recipients who were
not subject to personal income tax.
The Net Extra Burden as a Percentage of
Stockholders' Total Income
One more measure has been developed for this analysis. By relating the
extra burden to the total income of stockholders, we obtain the dif-
ferential against (or in favor of) stockholders. It enables us to ascertain
how much more heavily, measured in terms of effective rates, stock-
holders were actually taxed on the whole of their income from all
sources because of the combined (nonintegrated) corporate-personal
income tax system than they would have been with the corporate tax
abolished and their pro rata share of net corporate earnings subject
fully and promptly to the personal income tax.
Add to the symbols listed above:
S =imputedgross income of stockholders





=theextra burden on net corporate earnings. This is
also the extra burden on stockholders, since it is only
on the corporate earnings component of their income
that stockholders are differentially taxed.
Therefore:
ST+0
With 0 positive, the differential against stockholders lies below
that against net corporate earnings. But, since the only difference is
in the denominator, the smaller the value for 0, i.e., the larger the
176Double Taxation, Differential Taxation, and Tax Relief
proportion of T in S. the closer Ne/S to Thus, as we shall see,
at the lower stockholder income levels, the two measures diverge con-
siderably; near the top of the income scale, however, they lie very
close together. This is a reflection of the fact that, except for the
lowest portion of the income range, the proportion of T to S is a
rising fraction reading up the array of stockholder incomes.
What we have given here is a brief description. For a more thorough
explanation of these procedures, the reader is referred to Income-Tax
Burden on Stockholders, Chapters 1 and 2 and Appendix B.
Differential Taxation of Stockholders in 1950
We turn now to the findings, and, to anchor the discussion, present
them for a particular year 1950. Similar results, however, were obtained
for all years 1944—1952. Modifications of the pattern because of the
dividend tax relief provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
are considered later in this section.
Chart 9 and Table 44 summarize how heavy the differential taxa-
tion of net corporate earnings and of stockholder income was in terms
of the four selected measures, for the 1950 data. The reader is reminded
that the results are for "average" stockholders representing the aggre-
gate experience in each stockholder income class, that the values
plotted are those obtained from variant 2 of our standard measures,
and that the income of stockholders includes their pro rata share of
pre-tax corporate earnings. The marginal rate schedules for joint and
separate returns showed substantial differences, except at the two
extremes of the income range, because of the income splitting per-
mitted married stockholders. Therefore, the differentials for each
type of return were computed separately, and weighted averages were
struck for plotting the chart.
Examination of line 1 in Chart 9—the differential against earnings
for distribution—reveals that the double taxation of distributed earn-
ings was substantial but became steadily less severe as stockholder
income rose. At the bottom of the taxable stockholder income scale,
earnings for distribution were subject to a tax more than 34 per-
centage points higher than would have been due under the personal
income tax alone. At the $25,000 stockholder income level, the net
extra burden averaged about 29 percentage points, and at the top of
the stockholder income range plotted on the chart ($500,000) it was
only 10 per cent.














Earnings for Stockholder Imputed
Gross DistributionEarnings for Retention Net Corporate Earnings Gross Income
income Variants Variant Variant Variant
(WOO's) 1, 2, 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
1 34.3 27.3 30.0 43.6 30.0 31.7 40.0 5.4 5.7 7.2
2 34.2 26.9 29.3 43.0 29.7 31.2 39.6 6.0 6.3 8.0
3 34.3 26.8 29.1 42.6 29.7 31.1 39.4 6.2 6.5 8.2
4 33.9 26.1 28.7 42.3 29.1 30.7 39.1 5.5 5.8 7.4
5 33.8 26.3 28.8 42.3 29.1 30.7 39.0 5.7 6.0 7.6
6 34.0 26.2 28.7 42.3 29.2 30.8 39.1 5.7 6.0 7.6
8 33.7 24.0 26.5 40.0 27.7 29.3 37.6 8.6 9,0 11.6
10 32.9 23.1 26.0 39.5 26.8 28.6 36.9 9.3 9.9 12.8
12 32.7 21.7 24.6 38.2 25.9 27.7 36.0 9.4 10.0 13.0
15 32.1 19.2 22.0 35.5 24.0 25.9 34.2 9.1 9.7 12.8
20 30.8 15.2 18.5 32.0 21.2 23.3 31.6 9.0 9.8 13.4
25 29.2 11.3 15.2 28.7 18.2 20.6 28.9 8.4 9.5 13.4
50 24.9 —4.4 0.4 13.9 6.9 10.0 18.2 4.2 5.9 10.8
75 21.7 —12.4 —6.7 6.8 0.7 4.2 12.5 0.5 2.9 8.5
100 19.1 —17.3—11.4 2.1 —3.3 0.4 8.7 —2.3 0.3 6.1
150 16.7 —24.6—18.7 —5.1 —8.7 —5.0 3.3 —6.2 —3.6 2.3
200 14.6 —29.3—23.4 —9.9 —12.4 —8.7—0.4 —9.0 —6.3—0.3
250 13.2 —32.8—26.9—13.5 —15.0—11.4—3.1 —11.5 —8.7 —2.4
500 10.0 —33.8—32.9—19.3 —19.9—16.3—8.0 —17.5—14.3—7,0
While the differential against earnings for retention (line 2 of Chart
9) follows the same general pattern, it is lower at all income levels,
the difference becoming very marked over the upper portion of the
stockholder income array. Starting at 30 per cent for the lowest income
class, it falls rapidly to only 15 per cent at the $25,000 mark, above
which the burden changes to a benefit increasing to a differential of
—33 per cent at the top of the stockholder income scale. At this level
($500,000) the earnings for retention component of stockholders' in-
come was subject to a tax liability 33 percentage points less than would
have been the case had it been reached promptly and in full by the
personal income tax alone. It appears, then, that on their share of
earnings for retention some stockholders were overtaxed and others
were undertaxed to significant degrees. The inversion from over- to
undertaxation occurred, on average, at just over the $50,000 stock-
holder income.
The weighted average of these two measures, the differential against
net corporate earnings (line B), traces the same general path over the
income range as the differentials that comprise it, and falls between
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them. Reflecting the greater absolute magnitude of earnings for re-
tention, it lies closer to line 2 than to line 1. Over most of the income
scale the net corporate earnings component of stockholders' income
was overtaxed, but for stockholders higher up the income pyramid,
undertaxation occurred.34 The heaviest extra burden falls on the
lower stockholder income levels ($1,000 to $l0,000)—between 32 and
29 percentage points. Above $10,000 the differential drops rapidly,
reaching zero at about $100,000 and low point of —16 per cent at
$500,000. Thus the substantial over- or undertaxation found on net
corporate earnings depends on the stockholder's income level.
So far, we have measured the differential tax load on net corporate
earnings and its components. Now we relate the over- and undertaxa-
tion to total stockholder income. How much heavier or lighter was
the effective tax rate for stockholders than that applicable if their
income (including their full pro rata share of net corporation earn-
ings) had been reached by the personal income tax alone? 85 (The
personal income tax is used as the benchmark throughout this analysis
because it presumably measures the community's "consensus" as to
the rates of income taxation appropriate at different income levels. I
am not contending that this "consensus" has been deliberately arrived
at; rather, the legislative structure of our community suggests that
many considerations of varying degrees of merit and relevance, and
numerous factors, some purposeful, others accidental, all are associated
with the process by which this rate schedule was determined. Perhaps
"consensus" is not the right word here. The community has never
voted for a particular rate schedule per Se, nor has it chosen from
among candidates for legislative office on the basis of a particular rate
schedule as the only issue differentiating them. Yet if we raise the
question of what we have in fact established as our standard for per-
sonal income taxation, income being defined as regularly taxable in-
come, it is to this schedule we must look for an answer.)
To put the choice of benchmark in a somewhat different focus, we
might say we use the personal income tax rate schedule for this pur-
pose because it is the rate schedule that applies to income (withdrawn
84 In 1950, earnings for distribution totaled $11 billion, earnings for retention
$19 billion. (These figures are the totals for taxable stockholders only.)
85 Another way of putting the question is: How much heavier (or less onerous)
was the combined corporate-personal income tax rate on stockholders at a given
income level than the personal income tax on nonstockholders with a similar amount
of income?
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or retained in the business) generated by noncorporate business enter-
prises.
The answer is provided by the differential against stockholders' in.
come, line 4 on Chart 9. It appears that the majority of stockholders,
having incomes ranging from $1,000to$50,000, were liable to an ap-
preciable extra income tax of from 6 to 10 percentage points. Those
most severely affected were in the income range between $10,000 and
$25,000 with a maximum differential of 10 points. But near the top
of the income scale a different picture emerges, with the differential
declining very rapidly after the $50,000 point and reaching zero at a
little over $100,000. Stockholders with incomes above this point en-
joyed a tax benefit that became relatively more important as income
increased. Thus, at the $500,000 imputed gross income level we find
the combined corporate-personal income tax liability to be 14 per-
centage points lower than would have been the case without any
corporate tax but with stockholders' full pro rata share of net corporate
earnings subject only to the personal income tax.
Instead of falling constantly as income rises, the differential against
stockholders tends first to increase over a portion of the income range
and then, after reaching a maximum between the $10,000 to $20,000
level, to fall constantly thereafter. This difference in behavior com-
pared with the other three differentials occurs because of uneven varia-
tions in the proportion of imputed gross income derived from corpo-
rate earnings. For the value of the differential against stockholders is
equal to that fraction of the differential against net corporate earnings
that net corporate earnings represent of imputed gross income. In gen-
eral this fraction tends to rise with income. (This is why line 4 lies
closer to lineat the higher income levels.) Over the stockholder
income span from $6,000 to $20,000, the rise in the proportion of net
corporate earnings to imputed gross income more than compensates
for the fall in the differential against net corporate earnings, thereby
causing the product—the differential against stockholders—to rise over
this range.
The findings apply to average stockholders, and figures on how
many fell in the over- and undertaxed categories cannot be obtained
directly from these data. However, from a closely related set of pro-
cedures (detailed in Chapter 6 of Income-Tax Burden on Stockholders)
we can get some idea of the number of stockholders in each of these
categories. For 1950 the estimate is about 3.3 million double-taxed
stockholders. Slightly under 3.2 million paid a higher combined cor-
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porate-personal income tax than would have been due under the
personal income tax alone and were, in the sense adopted here, over-
taxed. On the other hand, some 4 per cent, about 130,000, were under-
taxed.36 For the latter, a higher tax liability would have occurred if
the corporate tax had been eliminated and their share of corporate
earnings had been taxed in full as personal income. While small as
a proportion of all stockholders, the undertaxed group assumes greater
importance when its share of all double-taxed net corporate earnings
is measured. Some 44 per cent of net corporate earnings was under-
taxed.
The findings for 1950 are based on the tax treatment of corporate
earnings then in effect. With the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
modifications of the procedure for taxing dividends were introduced
—an exclusion of the first $50 of dividends ($100 for joint returns) and
a personal income tax credit equal to 4 per cent of dividends over and
above the amount excluded. How this dividend tax relief would have
changed the results for 1950 is considered next.
But first we remind the reader that the findings just presented are
for a given year and hence their specific magnitude depends on the
particular levels of personal and corporate income tax, corporate
earnings, dividends, and corporate saving that prevailed in that year.
Values of the differentials annually from 1944 through 1952 can be
found in Income-Tax Burden on Stockholders, Appendix A. We note
in passing that for all these years the general pattern of results was
similar, i.e.,it shows differentials that decline with income, and, in
the case of earnings for retention and net corporate earnings, decline
sufficiently to lead to negative extra burdens. The income level at which
this "crossover" from extra burden to benefit occurred varied,o.f
course, from year to year. On a variant 2 basis, the lowest income
level at which the differential against net corporate earnings "crossed
over" was $30,000 in 1947; the highest, $138,000 in 1951.
Our findings are, of course, no more reliable than the assumptions
used in their derivation. This is not the place to analyze all our
assumptions or procedures, but two deserve specific mention. We
36Theseestimates, while germane, are not strictly comparable with the variant
2 values of the differentials that have been used in discussing the findings for 1950.
For in deriving the number of over- and undertaxed stockholders, no account was
taken of the future capital gains tax liability on reinvested earnings of 1950. An
adjustment on this score would lead to somewhat larger overtaxed and smaller
undertaxed totals than those given in the text. (See Income-Tax Burden on Stock-
holders, p. 154.)
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assumed, for reasons noted above, that the incidence of the corpora-
tion income tax is on stockholders via a commensurate decline in the
income generated on their behalf. This is still a widely held opinion.
But among students of public finance there is much disagreement about
this whole matter. If the corporate tax is shifted to any degree, the
findings given here overstate the extra tax burden and understate the
tax benefit. The larger the fraction of the tax shifted, the greater this
over- and understatement. We also accepted the tax law's definition
of income which permits tax-free recoupment of the outlays on de-
preciable assets but only on a historical cost basis. And not all tax-
payers have chosen the LIFO option for inventories. If corporate earn-
ings were measured with regard to current costs of maintaining in-
ventory and replacing depreciable assets, overtaxation would be found
to be more severe than we have measured it, while undertaxation
would be less pronounced. The effects of alternative definitions and
assumptions on the measures of stockholder differential taxation are
explored at some length in Chapter 4 of Income-Tax Burden on
Stockholders, but we insert Table 45 here to show the effect of varying
the two assumptions noted above.
TABLE 45
COMPARISON OF DIFFERENTIAL AGAINST NET CORPORATE EARNINGS UNDER






Assuming One-Half Taking Account of Current
Gross Income Standardthe Corporate Tax Price Level for Depreciable
(8000's) Method Is Shifted Assets and Inventory
1 24.6 11.1 393
3 23.8 10.7 39.5
5 22.5 9.4 38.1
10 17.7 5.0 33.4
25 2.0 —10.0 18.3
50 —7.6 —18.1 10.1
100 —16.2 —26.3 1.7
250 —24.5 —33.9 —5.3
500 —25.7 —34.8 —6.1
NoTE: See pp. 81—103 of Holland, Income-Tax Burden on Stockholders, for an expla-
nation of these adjustments.
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Effect of Relief Provisions on Differentials
The analysis in the first part of this chapter of the relief provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 ran in terms of marginal dollars.
In order to determine how much relief on the average, rather than
at the margin, tends to be provided by the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, its provisions have been applied to our average stockholder data
for 1950. The results are shown in Table 46.
An examination of column 6 shows that the absolute reduction in
the extra tax burden (measured in percentage points) is greatest at
the lowest income and falls steadily as income rises. Apparently, this
contradicts the point made earlier that the relief afforded by the
dividend tax credit is the same at all income levels, while relief trace-
able to the exclusion of a flat amount of dividends rises with stock-
holder income. But this conclusion referred to marginal increments of
earnings for distribution of the same amount at all income levels. Here,
we are concerned with the total amount of earnings for distribution,
and that, of course, varies with the stockholders' income. So the pattern
TABLE 46
EFFECT OF RELtEF PROVISIONS OF INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954 ON DIFFERENTIAL
AGAINST EARNINGS FOR DISTRIBUTION
(estimated from 1950 data)







Inlernal Revenue Code o/ 1954 a
Absolute Reduc-Relative Recluc- Per Cent of
Gross Stockholder Earnings tion in Differ- tion in Differ-
Income Income for Distri- Differential ential ential
($000's) Amount(Col. 2 ÷ Col.1) bution After Relief(Col. 4 —Col.5)(Col. 6 ÷ Cot. 4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1 $ 70 7% 34.3% 24.3% 10.0% 29.2%
3 242 8 34.3 27.8 6.5 19.0
5 376 8 • 33.8 28.3 3.5 16.3
10 1,343 13 32.9 29.3 3.6 10.9
15 2,176 15 32.1 29.1 3.0 9.3
25 4,458 18 29.2 26.4 2.8 9.6
50 11,519 23 24.9 22.3 2.6 10.4
100 27,013 27 19.1 16.6 2.5 13.1
250 73,418 29 13.2 10.8 2.4 18.2
500 169,989 34 10.0 7.6 2.4 24.0
a Exclusion of $50 for separate and $100 for joint returns plus tax credit of 4 per cent of dividends in
excess of excluded amount.
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of relief we now get is a matter of weighting. At the lower stockholder
incomes where the amount of earnings for distribution is small, the
exclusion, which gives more relief per dollar, far outweighs the credit
in importance; hence the large amount of relief (measured in percent-
age points of differential reduction). As we move up the income scale
and the amount of earnings for distribution increases, the weight of
the exclusion in the relief provided dwindles, while the credit grows
in importance. For the highest incomes, the effect of the exclusion is
negligible, and the absolute amount of relief (measured in percentage
points of differential reduction) tends to approach the constant set by
the credit alone.
Column 7 contains the data relevant to an appraisal of the degree
of relief, i.e., the amount of relief relative to the severity of the inequity
it is designed to ameliorate. Here the pattern is U-shaped. Propor-
tionately the greatest relief is provided at the bottom and top of the
income scale, with a lesser degree of easing of the extra burden in
between. These results follow from two factors already noted—the
relative weights of the exclusion and credit, and the fact that the
differential moves inversely with income. At the lower income levels
the exclusion has a substantial effect, accounting for the high degree
of relief there. Moving up the income scale, the exclusion fades in
importance, and the absolute amount of relief tails off toward the
constant provided by the credit. With the differential declining as
income rises, after a point (somewhere after $15,000 of imputed gross
income on average), the higher the stockholder's income, the greater
the degree of relief provided.
Since the differential against earnings for distribution is only one
aspect of the unequal taxation of stockholders, it may be of interest
to view the relief provisions against the net result of stockholders'
differential taxation, i.e., with reference to the differentials against
net corporate earnings and stockholders. This is done in Table 47.
But our first conclusion is so obvious that no reference to the table
is required. It is merely this: Relief is provided all dividend recipients,
yet while some stockholders were overtaxed on their share of corporate
earnings, others were undertaxed. Relief is granted to the latter as
well as to the former. Specifically, the data of the table show that
the differential against stockholders (taking account of both distribu-
tions and retentions on their behalf) is moderated but slightly, some-
thing on the order of 5 to 10 per cent (see column 5 or 9 of Table 47).
On the other hand, existing undertaxation is made more pronounced.
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TABLE 47
REDUCTION IN AGAINST NET C01U'ORATE AND STOCKBOLDER INCOMES
DUE TO RELIEF PRovisIoNs OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954
(estimatedfrom 1950 data)




Differential AgainstNet Corporale Earnings Differential Against StockholderIncome
—
Imputed Absolute Relative Absolute Relative
Gross ReductionReduction ReductionReduction
Before After (Col. 2 — (Col. 4 ÷ Before After (Col. 6 — (Col. 8 +
($000's) Relief Relief Col. 3) Col. 2) Relief Relief Col. 7) Col. 6)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1 31.7 27.8 3.9 12.3 5.7 5.0 0.7 12.3
3 31.1 28.6 2.5 8.0 6.5 6.0 0.5 7.7
5 30.7 28.6 2.1 6.8 6.0 5.6 0.4 6.7
10 28.6 27.2 1.4 4.9 9.9 9.5 0.4 4.0
15 25.9 24.7 1.2 4.6 9.7 9.3 0.4 4.1
25 20.1 19.5 1.1 5.3 9.5 9.0 0.5 5.6
50 10.0 8.8 1.2 12.0 5.9 5.3 0.6 10.2
iOU 0.4 —0.6 1.0 250.0 0.3 —0.4 0.7 233.3
250 —11.4 —12.3 0.9 79b —8.7 —9.4 0.7 80b
500 —16.3 —17.2 0.9 55b —14.3 —15.1 0.8
a Exclusionof $50 for separate and $100 for joint returns plus tax credit of 4 per cent of dividends in
excess of excluded amount.
b Denotes increase in differentials in favor of net corporate earnings and stockholders.
Of course this type of uneven result is frequently found for tax
relief granted by the statutes; in the nature of the case, Congress will
prefer measures which result in the application of fairly simple rules
of computation of tax or tax credit; and inevitably the impact varies
unevenly among taxpayers. This does not mean, however, that the
dividend relief could not have been framed to fit the facts more closely
without undue trouble for the taxpayer had the real nature of "double
taxation" been used as a guide for the relief provisions. Moreover,
some additional complexity, had that been necessary, might well have
been worth the effort if providing greater relief at some future time
were being seriously considered. For, as we have seen, the peculiarities
of the method chosen become more pronounced as the rate of tax
credit is increased.
Yet in pointing out the differential degree of relief the credit and
exclusion provide among stockholders, we should not lose sight of
the fact that some measure of relief has been provided them all.
186
1